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The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority
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RICHARD H. PILDES*
The Supreme Court launched the practice, twenty years ago, of creating
safe minority election districts. To comply with the Court's mandate,
election districts throughout the United States were redrawn in the wake of
the 1990 Census. Ironically, though, ever since the Court spawned this
practice, it has been trying to cabin its own creation. In every single
plenary decision since that initial moment of creation, the Court has cut
back on the obligation to create safe minority districts, whether through
constitutional limits on racial redistricting or though narrow readings of
the scope of the Voting Rights Act.
Nonetheless, the politics of safe districting has retained a life of its own.
Even as the Court has reduced the force of legal obligations, the political
practice of safe districting remains much as it became in the early 1990s.
Whether due to the increased political power of minority communities, the
power of incumbent minority officeholders, or misunderstandings about the
legal obligations the Voting Rights Act actually imposes today, safe
minority districts where such districts can be created remains the norm.
In the first Voting Rights Act decision of the Roberts Court, the Court found
part of Texas' recent congressional redistricting to violate the Act. As the
first full decision on the merits to find the design of a congressional district
to violate the Act, the Court's decision has been celebrated by many
commentators as signaling a new Court commitment to the race-conscious
design of safe election districts. This Article argues to the contrary.
Properly understood, the Court's decision is yet another step in the Court's
efforts to pull back from the implications of its initial intervention that
revolutionized the design of election districts. Even so, this Article
concludes, the political practice of safe districting will remain unaffected by
the Court's most recent effort to limit it. If so, it will not be the first time a
revolution has consumed its own creators.
I.
The first Voting Rights Act (VRA) decision of the Roberts Court,
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry,1 which
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addressed the Tom DeLay-inspired congressional redistricting of Texas,
would seem initially to be a triumphant moment for the Act. For the first time
in a full opinion on the merits since the critical 1982 amendments to the
VRA, the Court held that a redistricting plan diluted minority voting power
and hence violated Section 2 of the Act. The Court chose to endorse, from
among all the legal attacks marshaled against the Texas plan, the Mexican-
American Legal Defense Fund's (MALDEF) claim that the Texas plan
diluted Hispanic voting power. The contrast with the Court's continued
indecisive floundering over partisan gerrymandering claims-once again,
LULAC exposed a Court unable to reach meaningful consensus on even
whether partisan gerrymandering claims should be justiciable, let alone the
standards by which such claims should be judged-makes this VRA holding
all the more striking. In a decision that cuts across the conventional
ideological lines that divide the Court, particularly in VRA cases, Justice
Kennedy joined with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer to hold
that, whatever else the Texas plan might have done, it violated the VRA.
Thus, the MALDEF-inspired vision of the VRA triumphed over the DeLay-
inspired gerrymander.
Understandable as it is to view this result as a victory for the VRA, such
a view fundamentally misunderstands, I believe, the new Court's stance
towards the Act. Far from a ringing endorsement of the law of minority vote
dilution, LULAC reveals a Court increasingly troubled by-indeed, more and
more resistant to-the very concept of minority vote dilution and the
accompanying legal requirement of "safe minority districting." This
resistance is not a radical new departure of the Roberts Court as much as an
accentuation of principles that have been gathering force over the last fifteen
years. The highwater mark of the Court's embrace of safe minority
districting was the 1986 decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,2 a divided
decision issued in the immediate wake of Congress's 1982 amendments to
the VRA. But not long after the ink was dry on Gingles-indeed, in every
single districting case receiving plenary consideration since Gingles-the
Court began searching for ways to pull back from the system that Gingles
had wrought. First in the Shaw line of cases, 3 then in cases rejecting
Section 2 and Section 5 claims on the merits,4 a majority of the Court has
continuously sought, without interruption, to cabin and confine safe minority
2 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
3 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
4 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
528 U.S. 320 (1999); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997); Johnson v.
DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1997); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
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districting to a narrower and narrower domain. Remarkably, until LULAC,
the Court had not upheld a single Section 2 VRA claim in any case the Court
has given plenary consideration since the moment Gingles was decided. 5
LULAC itself engaged three distinct VRA claims. And even as the Court
deployed the VRA to invalidate one district, the Court manifested additional
and more destabilizing grounds for resistance to safe minority districting that
will likely see fruition in the coming years. The immediate and most visible
effect of LULAC was to preserve one Hispanic majority district; but the
short-term, obviously intended, secondary effect was to lead lower courts to
dismantle another Hispanic majority district that the DeLay gerrymander had
created; and the more long-term effects of the views intimated in LULAC
will likely be to cut back on the scope of the VRA in dimensions other than
those formally presented in LULAC.
The net effect of LULAC will be to limit substantially the legal
imperative to design safe minority election districts. With Justice Kennedy
now in the driver's seat on these issues, replacing Justice O'Connor, those
limits are likely to increase. The differences between Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor in the voting-rights field were always subtle-more latent than
fully articulated-but profound and evident to attentive readers.6 Now that
Justice Kennedy fully occupies the Court's center on these issues, LULAC
suggests those differences will blossom into a commanding Court antipathy
toward legally-mandated safe minority districting (as long as the current
composition of the Court remains the same).
Properly understood, LULAC, read in conjunction with decisional trends
over the last decade, portends Court resistance to such districting that will
find expression in numerous legal doctrines and issues that arise under the
VRA and the Constitution. To the extent the current Court addresses further
VRA issues on the merits, this resistance will be, I believe, pervasive. It will
affect the way the Roberts Court interprets the VRA itself, with revisions
possible in the legal concepts core to vote-dilution theory, such as what
5 The Court has rejected constitutional challenges to race-conscious districting in
certain circumstances. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Lawyer v. Dep't of
Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997); DeWitt v. Wilson, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995) (summary
affirmance). The Court has also upheld the constitutionality of the procedural
requirement of Section 5 preclearance as applied to one somewhat unusual context in
Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
6 See Vera, 517 U.S. at 956-86 (plurality opinion); id at 990-95 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 996-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29
(O'Connor, J., concurring); DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1026-31 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See also Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting,
106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2505 n.6 (1997).
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constitutes, in the legally relevant sense, "racially polarized voting."'7
Looming over all these issues, as well, is Congress's recent reauthorization in
2006 of Section 5 of the VRA and the question, likely to reach the Court in
the next couple years, of whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power
in reauthorizing the Act on the terms that Congress invoked. LULAC also
suggests that, however the Court resolves that issue, it will certainly
approach the question with demanding standards in mind.
To be sure, how much the Court continues unwinding the regime Gingles
created will depend on how aggressively litigants are prepared to challenge
that regime in the lower courts and how many opportunities the Court gets to
revisit these questions. The Court does not address VRA issues often and
might not have occasion to harvest the seeds planted in LULAC for a number
of years. More importantly, perhaps, none of this suggests that we will
suddenly see the demise of majority-black or Hispanic election districts.
Most such districts already in existence will likely be maintained; where such
districts arise or are sustained as a result of the ordinary pressures of political
bargaining and deal making, they will continue to exist. At this point, the
power of minority communities and the political forces surrounding safe
minority districting might, as a practical matter, be more important than the
legal ones. But with respect to the legal side of this dynamic, LULAC
suggests that the era of aggressive legal mandates to create such districts is
beginning to draw to a close.
II.
A single unifying theme courses through the several VRA issues the
Texas case presented: the center of the Court believes that legally-required
safe minority districting is in tension with basic ideals of democratic
citizenship and should be required only when compelling circumstances
justify it, such as when racial discrimination in the design of election districts
is truly intentional ("intentional" is, of course, a freighted concept in this
area, and I will address its meaning to the Court below). Though the VRA-
aspect of LULAC that garnered the most immediate media and legal attention
was the Court's use of the Act to invalidate District 23, the Court addressed
three distinct VRA issues. On each, the Court acted to limit the scope of
obligatory safe districting-even, perhaps surprisingly, on the issue upon
which the Court relied to invalidate District 23 itself.
7 For a discussion of the meaning of "racially polarized voting" and its historical role
in the development of VRA doctrine, see Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the
Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv.
1833, 1833-50 (1992).
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The most dramatic new principle concerning the VRA emerged in the
Court's treatment not of District 23, which the Court invalidated, but of
another district, District 25, which ran from Austin to the Rio Grande
Valley. 8 This district was intentionally designed to be a Hispanic-majority
congressional district. Because the Court did not formally hold District 25
illegal, some might be tempted to dismiss the Court's harsh condemnation of
it as mere rhetorical flourish. I believe the opposite. Indeed, I would go so far
as to speculate that Justice Kennedy's discomfort with the Austin-to-Rio
Grande District 25 was the driving force behind the entire VRA thrust of the
LULAC decision. To begin with, the very first question Justice Kennedy
pressed at the oral argument reflected a concern-in a case the Court had
studied for months in internal conferences before argument-that there was
something wrong about the design of District 25. 9 Justice Kennedy was
determined to thrust this district into the center of the argument (some
districts have legal greatness thrust upon them). 10 In his aggressive
questioning, Justice Kennedy flatly stated his view that Texas had used
"race" in an "insulting way" in designing District 25.11 From both the
argument and final opinion, it appears clear that Justice Kennedy was
determined not to let this Austin-Rio Grande district stand and certainly not
to let the Court endorse districts designed in this way.
Justice Kennedy's concerns about this district, in fact, appear to have
driven his invalidation of District 23, rather than the other way around. The
Texas legislature had believed it necessary to create the Austin-Rio Grande
district-or some other district like it-to offset its prior decision to carve up
the previously Hispanic-majority District 23 (a decision the lower court had
thought motivated by partisan politics, not by an aim to minimize Hispanic
voting power). 12 If carving up such districts generated an imperative to create
districts as offensive as District 25, Justice Kennedy seemed to believe, then
the VRA regime had to be construed to cut off this pressure at its source.
Holding the redesign of District 23 to violate the VRA was a means of doing
exactly that-of eliminating the pressure to create "offensive" districts, in
Justice Kennedy's view, such as District 25, which ran all the way from
Austin to the Rio Grande.
Justice Kennedy found it easier to express the nature of his concerns
about the Austin-Rio Grande district than to identify the precise legal
cubbyhole into which those concerns could be fit. Had the central concern
8 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2612-20 (2006).
9 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (Nos. 05-
204, 05-254, 05-276, 05-439).
10 See id
I IId. at9.
12 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2613.
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been that this district sprawled over too much territory, intentionally
meandering to pick up enough pockets of Hispanic voters to constitute a
majority, the Court, or at least Justice Kennedy, could have simply applied
the Shaw doctrine and concluded District 25 was geographically not
sufficiently compact to be constitutional. But Justice Kennedy had a bigger
target in mind. 13
What clearly bothered him, more than or in addition to the geographic
sprawl of this district, was that it joined together poor rural Hispanics along
the Texas border with the far more well-off Hispanics living in the urban,
state capitol area of Austin. Invoking the lower court's findings of fact,
Justice Kennedy noted that these different "Latino communities at the
opposite ends of District 25 have divergent 'needs and interests,' owing to
'differences in socio-economic status, education, employment, health, and
other characteristics."" 14 Though these differences did not put District 25 at
odds with the VRA for the lower court (even though that court was
composed of at least some judges not known to be sympathetic to the VRA),
for Justice Kennedy, the Austin and Rio Grande Hispanic communities lived
in worlds far apart, not just physically, but culturally, economically,
educationally, and in other ways--differences that were decisive. For Texas
to lump these voters together, because they were Hispanic, was to engage in
what Justice Kennedy viewed as a troubling and legally problematic "racial
essentialism." In the key passage, he concluded that the racial essentialism he
saw at work in the Austin-Rio Grande district was itself inconsistent with the
VRA. In Justice Kennedy's words: "We do a disservice to these important
13 The oral argument suggested Justice Kennedy might have been prepared to hold
District 25 unconstitutional on Shaw grounds, which would have extended Shaw by
constitutionalizing a requirement that districts be culturally as well as geographically
compact. See supra notes 9-11. But a majority of the Court rejected that view. Indeed,
although the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito believed the race-
conscious design of District 25 required that Texas justify that district's design under the
standards of strict scrutiny, these Justices concluded that District 25 met that demanding
standard and therefore survived Shaw review. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2666-69 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). One of the further,
insufficiently appreciated challenges LULAC poses for the future of the VRA is that this
four-Justice concurrence, combined with Justice Kennedy's expressed views in prior
cases, means that a majority of the Court now holds that intentional race-conscious
districting always triggers strict scrutiny review. There had been considerable ambiguity
on that issue before; indeed, my view is that a major divide between Justice O'Connor
and other Justices supportive of Shaw had been that she believed, in effect, that strict
scrutiny was triggered only when race-consciously designed districts deviated from
traditional districting principles. Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and
Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2539-47 (1997).
14 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2613 (citations omitted).
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goals [of the VRA] by failing to account for the differences between people
of the same race." 15
It is difficult to overstate how dramatically destabilizing this anti-
essentialism principle is to conventional interpretation of the VRA.
Defenders of the conventional view would argue that the Act does not
essentialize racial identity, because the Act does not require minority voters
to be districted together merely because they are minorities. The Act is
triggered only when minority voters are "politically cohesive" (as well as
when majority and minority voters exhibit polarized voting patterns), which
means when minority voters actually vote together for the same candidates-
meaning, for example, that Hispanic voters overwhelmingly vote for
Hispanic candidates pitted against Anglo competitors. 16 The Hispanic voters
in Austin and the Rio Grande Valley did share common voting preferences
for Hispanic candidates.' 7 But Justice Kennedy expressly rejected these
common candidate preferences as sufficient to rebuff the essentializing
concern. In his view, the VRA requires more than that "all the members of a
racial group, added together, [can] control election outcomes." 18 Over and
above common candidate preferences, the minority group must constitute a
community of substantive interest, as reflected in socioeconomic and other
commonalities, before the VRA is triggered.
The Shaw cases had held that race-conscious districting had to be
limited, for constitutional reasons, to districts that were reasonably compact
geographically. LULAC now adds to this the constraint that such districts
must be, not only geographically compact, but ideologically coherent-and,
most importantly, coherent in a deeper or broader sense than that minority
voters share a preference for minority candidates pitted against majority
ones. That is, districts must be "culturally" as well as geographically
compact. 19
15Id. at 2618.
16 Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
17 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment, and dissenting in part) (noting lower-court findings that District 25 would
function effectively as a Latino opportunity district).
18 Id. at 2618.
19 Dan Ortiz coined the label "culturally compact" to identify the Court's
requirement, but Ortiz speculates that either geographic or cultural compactness is likely
to be sufficient. Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48, 50 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/
vo1105/ortiz.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). I view the matter differently and believe the
two dimensions will interact, should the Court address the issue in later cases. The less
culturally homogenous a minority community appears to be, the more demanding the
Court might be about what constitutes a sufficiently compact district geographically.
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What is the legal status of this principle? Put another way, did the Court
actually hold the Austin-Rio Grande district unconstitutional or illegal under
the VRA? The question leads to an amusing, perhaps revealing, Freudian slip
in the Court's opinion. The opinion for the Court comes right up to the brink
of holding this district itself to violate the VRA, but the Court blinked before
jumping into that abyss. Technically, the Court does not quite formally hold
District 25 illegal. But Justices Souter and Ginsburg, providing the crucial
votes to give Justice Kennedy a majority of the Court, read Justice
Kennedy's opinion to do just that-to hold that District 25 itself was
illegal. 20 And they signed on to that result. One possibility as to why the
Justices lacked a shared understanding of what they had actually decided is
that drafts of Justice Kennedy's opinion had gone to the point of holding
District 25 to violate the VRA, but that late in the day Justice Kennedy had
backed away from this conclusion, while the concurring opinion had failed to
keep up. Another possibility, the more Freudian one, is that Justices Souter
and Ginsburg rightly heard the music being played in Justice Kennedy's
opinion. Even if that opinion did not strike the note that would hold District
25 to violate the VRA, everything about Justice Kennedy's opinion sounds
that tune.
From a legal perspective, the least Justice Kennedy's approach might
mean-and this would still have dramatic consequences for the VRA-is
that the Act is not violated even when there is racially polarized voting unless
an election district can be created in which minority voters are not just a
numerical majority, but in which the district is also geographically and
culturally compact. States might not then have VRA obligations to create
districts that, for example, bring together urban and rural minorities, or
suburban and city ones, even when voting is racially polarized. Similarly, as
the black middle class continues to expand, the class differences between
these voters and those living in poorer inner-city or rural areas might also
preclude a VRA obligation to unite these voters in a single district, even
when voting is racially polarized. Racially polarized voting would remain
necessary to prove a VRA violation, but not sufficient. "Naturally arising"
safe minority districts would still remain required by the Act, such as districts
in urban areas that have large minority populations geographically
concentrated with similar socioeconomic characteristics-or, to put the point
more in Justice Kennedy's terms, a State's failure to create such districts or
its intentional dismantling of them where they "naturally arise" would be
viewed as discrimination and a violation of the VRA. At a minimum, LULAC
20 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2647 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I join Part III of the principal opinion, in which the Court holds that Plan 1374C's
Districts 23 and 25 violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, in
diluting minority voting strength.").
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leaves no doubt that Section 2 of the VRA does not require, and should not
be read to require, districts of the Austin-Rio Grande type (assuming the
Justices who signed Justice Kennedy's opinion actually agree with all that it
says). 21
Alternatively, rather than Justice Kennedy's concerns flowing through a
redefinition of what it means for a district to be "compact," it is easy to
imagine these concerns being channeled into a redefinition of what the law
considers racially polarized voting to be. Until now, that definition, going
back to Gingles, has been that white and black (or Hispanic) voters
consistently have different candidate preferences (typically tied to the race of
the candidates), such that a white majority can consistently defeat the
candidates minority voters prefer. 22 The simplicity of this "bivariate"
conception of racially-polarized voting has long been a sore spot to critics of
the Gingles approach. Going back to Gingles itself, for example, Justice
O'Connor took issue with the Court's 5-4 decision on just this point, arguing
that the Gingles understanding of polarized voting was overly simplistic and
unfaithful to congressional purpose.23  Recent cases have already
incorporated other aspects of Justice O'Connor's Gingles concurrence into
judicial doctrine. 24 No stretch of imagination is required, therefore, to
21 This Article treats Justice Kennedy's views as the ones that define the center of
the current Court in closely contested VRA cases and that therefore control outcomes.
This universally-shared assumption is more complicated regarding Justice Kennedy's
view in LULAC that only culturally compact districts are required by the VRA because
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito expressly dissented from that position. See
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment,
and dissenting in part). That suggests that Justice Kennedy might hold a more constricted
view of the VRA than either of these other Justices. On the other hand, these two Justices
went out of their way in LULAC to state the following: "It is a sordid business, this
divvying us up by race." Id. at 2663. Given that statement, there is reason to wonder
whether these two Justices will actually endorse a more expansive view of the VRA than
Justice Kennedy in a case when such a difference would actually affect the outcome. At
the same time, the Justices typically most supportive of expansive VRA interpretations,
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, joined Justice Kennedy's "cultural
compactness" requirement, which would narrow the scope of the VRA. Whether those
Justices, too, would adhere to such a view in another case is also uncertain. Given the
uncertainty about what these various positions bode for the future, I continue to assume
Justice Kennedy's views will be the controlling ones on the current Court, at least, and
this Article thus rests on those views when it refers to the "center" of the Court or "the
Court."
22 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
23 See id. at 83-105 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). However, Georgia v. Ashcroft was
recently overruled by the 2006 renewal of the Voting Rights Act, which mandates that
preclearance should be denied to any voting law that "has the purpose of or will have the
effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or
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envision the Court similarly adopting today a version of her approach to
defining racial polarization. Some lower courts have found ways already to
import more complexity than Gingles endorsed into the racial polarization
analysis.25 Of course, exactly what form a more complex, multivariate
approach to defining racial polarization might take will remain a challenge
for those seeking to supplant Gingles's approach. But Justice Kennedy's
expressed concerns in LULAC about the Act over-essentializing racial
identity could certainly emerge in the form of Court reconsideration of when
voting behavior is sufficiently troubling as to rise to the level of racial
polarization that triggers the Act. LULAC might therefore signal increasing
pressure in the coming years on the continuing vitality of the Gingles concept
of racially-polarized voting.
Beyond redefining what Section 2 of the VRA requires of jurisdictions,
LULAC might suggest the current Court's willingness to redefine
"retrogression" under Section 5 of the Act. Thus, if covered jurisdictions
were to dismantle non-culturally compact safe minority districts, perhaps
LULAC portends that the Court will not consider such an act to be
retrogressive in violation of Section 5. If there were no legal obligation to
create such a district in the first place, as the Court now understands the Act,
then undoing such a district might not be retrogressive. For jurisdictions
outside the special coverage provisions of Section 5, Justice Kennedy's
vision of cultural compactness might emerge in the form of constitutional
challenges to earlier-drawn safe minority districts that are not culturally
compact. It is not difficult to imagine that a Court that, in the Shaw cases, has
already found non-geographically compact minority districts to violate ideals
of democratic citizenship would also conclude that non-culturally compact
minority districts do so as well. Given the principles Justice Kennedy
expressed in LULAC, it is not difficult to imagine Justice Kennedy, in
particular, reaching such a conclusion.
When LULAC was initially decided, some celebrated it as a major
victory for the VRA. But those celebrations failed to hear, as other actors
inevitably would, the larger music inspiring the Court's decision. The
aftermath of LULAC, I believe, confirms this view. The three-judge lower-
court, tasked with redrawing Texas' districts in light of LULAC, heard the
message loud and clear. That court dismantled the Hispanic majority Austin-
Rio Grande district that the DeLay gerrymanderers had believed necessary to
color ... to elect their preferred candidates of choice." Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks,
and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577, 580-81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(2006)). For a more detailed discussion of the 2006 renewal of the Voting Rights Act, see
infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th
Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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create.26 In the DeLay-inspired plan, that district had a Latino citizen voting-
age population of 55%. In the lower-court redesign following LULAC, that
population plummeted to 23.9%.27 The byproduct of the successful VRA
attack on one district was the decimation of a different, Hispanic-majority
district. Even as LULAC used the VRA to preserve one Latino majority
district, it destroyed another. In immediate political terms, this was, to be
sure, a short-term victory for Latino voters; the reformed districts generated a
net gain of one Latino-preferred member of Congress.28 But in the longer
term, the Court's legal assessment of District 25 will, if followed,
significantly reduce legal obligations to create safe minority-election
districts.
III.
I have focused thus far on what I consider the dominant VRA
implications of LULAC. Those seeking such implications, I have suggested,
should focus on the too-easily overlooked hostility the Court expressed
toward the Austin-Rio Grande district, a hostility that spawned the
dismantling on remand of that district. Moreover, there is an underlying unity
of vision behind that aspect of LULAC and the two other contexts in which
the Court addressed other VRA issues.
A second major VRA issue raised was whether minority plaintiffs could
prevail in arguing that Section 2 required recognition of "coalitional district"
claims. In the specific context at issue, the DeLay gerrymander had
dismantled the district held for more than two decades by Martin Frost, the
most powerful Anglo Democrat in the Texas congressional delegation.
Frost's district-District 24-had been 49.8% Anglo, 25.7% African-
American, and 20.8% Hispanic in citizen voting-age population. 29 The
26 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 457 F. Supp. 2d 716 (E.D.
Tex. 2006).
27 In the first elections under the court-redrawn districts,, a Hispanic Democratic
candidate strongly supported by Hispanic voters won in District 23, while an Anglo
Democratic candidate won in District 25. See Texas Republican Ousted as Last Seat
Filled, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2006, at A4; Office of United States Representative Ciro
Rodriguez, http://rodriguez.house.gov/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2007); United States
Representative Lloyd Doggett, http://www.house.gov/doggett/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2007). Congressman Doggett had represented District 25 before the Supreme Court's
LULAC decision and continued to do so after the lower court on remand redrew his
district. Whether Congressman Doggett is the "candidate of choice" of Hispanic voters in
District 25 would require analysis of legal issues and voting data beyond the scope of this
Article.
28 See Texas Republican Ousted as Last Seat Filled, supra note 27.
29 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2624 (2006).
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DeLay plan "broke apart this racially diverse district, assigning its pieces into
several other districts." 30 Plaintiffs argued that, even though African-
American voters did not nominally control this district, they effectively
controlled it and had consistently supported Frost as their candidate of
choice. They noted that black voters made up approximately 64% of
Democratic primary voters and hence nominally, as well as functionally,
controlled the decisive primary election. Because the district was
overwhelmingly Democratic in general elections, black-voter control of this
primary was thus tantamount to black-voter control of the district. 31
Moreover, Frost's voting record had a 94% approval rating from the
N.A.A.C.P.-the highest of any member in the Texas congressional
delegation, including black and Hispanic congress members-and numerous
black elected officials testified that Frost had strong support and was a
candidate of choice in the black community. 32
A "coalitional district" is one that functions as an effective ability-to-
elect district for minority voters even though they do not constitute a formal
majority of eligible voters.33 A coalitional-district claim is that, just as the
VRA requires or protects "safe" minority districts (that is, majority-minority
districts) in some circumstances, it similarly protects coalitional districts
when the latter effectively function in much the same way that safe districts
do. On this view, there is nothing talismanic about whether minority voters
constitute a formal majority or not; the only question that matters is how a
district functions in fact, which turns on how different groups actually tend to
vote. Functionally, districts in which black voters are a formal minority, but
that operate in effect as a safe minority district, should have the same legal
status as safe districts, given the policies and purposes of the VRA. In the
context of Martin Frost's district, this coalitional district claim was plausible,
for at least two reasons.
First, going into the 2000 round of districting, academic commentary had
anticipated that this decade would see the rise of such claims, given the
changing nature of voting patterns.34 In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court had
30 d.
31 The ironic resonance of the Texas white-primary cases from the first half of the
twentieth century will not be lost on those steeped in this history. See Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
32 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (Souter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
33 See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1517, 1539-40 (2002).
34 See id. at 1539-63. For the argument that black voters' control over Democratic
primaries, in districts that reliably vote Democratic in general elections, should be taken
into account in implementing the VRA, see generally Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing
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embraced this commentary and adopted one version of these coalitional-
district claims. 35 The Court had held that, to some extent, coalitional districts
could be substituted for safe districts for purposes of Section 5 of the VRA.
LULAC presented what might be thought the flip-side of the same coin:
whether viable coalitional districts are required under Section 2 in the same
contexts in which safe districts would otherwise be required. Second, the
Department of Justice staff lawyers in the Voting Rights Section had
concluded that the plaintiff's claim regarding the Frost district was correct.36
Though higher-level policy officials in that Section rejected the staffs
analysis, the disagreement in the Department of Justice signaled that the
claim was plausible, as evidenced by the fact that at least two Justices on the
Court also endorsed it.
Nonetheless, the Court rejected this claim. In the Court's view, there was
no way to know whether Frost was really the candidate of choice of black
voters in District 24 because no black candidate (or any other candidate) had
ever challenged him in a primary.37 Perhaps, the Court speculated, had a
credible black opponent emerged, black voters would have gotten cold feet
about Frost.38 As a factual matter, if this kind of speculation is sufficient to
Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79
N.C.L. REv. 1383 (2001).
35 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 483 (2003).
36 See Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal: Voting Rights
Finding on Map Pushed by DeLay Was Overruled, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at Al.
37 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2624.
38 Beneath the surface of this issue is an even more awkward one that courts seek to
avoid: can a white candidate be considered, legally, a "candidate of choice" of a minority
community for purposes of the VRA? That the answer should be no was argued
forcefully by Justice White, who otherwise supported the majority in Gingles. Thomburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 83 (1986) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In his view, the concept of racial discrimination in the VRA applied only when white
voters were voting against black candidates, not against white candidates the black
community preferred. To hold that the Act applied in the latter context would turn the
VRA into a form of protection for "interest-group politics rather than a rule hedging
against racial discrimination." Id. This position was not briefed in LULAC. Had the Court
been prepared to accept it, the challenge under the VRA to the dismantling of Frost's
district would have been rejected at the threshold.
Though Justice White's position is understandable, there is nonetheless something
undeniably disturbing about it. That the VRA is triggered only when black voters support
black candidates and whites do not might be consistent with the logic and purpose of the
Act, but it suggests a kind of racial essentialism of its own: can white candidates not be
the genuine candidates of choice of black voters? Thus, Justice Brennan for a plurality
rejected Justice White's position and held that the race of the candidate was not
"pertinent" to Section 2 analysis. Id. at 68 (Brennan, J., majority opinion). Lower courts
have fudged on this awkward question. Many label elections involving black candidates
"the most probative" for VRA analysis without flatly holding that whites cannot ever be
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defeat coalitional district claims on behalf of white candidates in this case, it
will likely be so in almost any case, given the obvious strength of support
Frost had among black voters. Perhaps if Frost were black, rather than white,
the Court would have been more open to the VRA challenge to the
dismantling of his district-but that would then force the Court to confront
the uncomfortable issue of whether the VRA applies only, in effect, to black
candidates. Perhaps if a candidate (white or black) in Frost's circumstances
actually defeated, with overwhelming black voting support, a black primary
opponent, the Court would be more receptive to a coalitional-district claim.
To the extent coalitional-district claims remain viable, though, LULAC
narrows the eye of the needle through which they will have to pass to
succeed.
But even more revealing than the Court's willingness to cabin in VRA
claims with speculative factual possibilities are the philosophical and legal
reasons the Court expressed for rejecting this VRA challenge. To accept this
kind of VRA claim would, in the Court's words, "unnecessarily infuse race
into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions." 39
The current Court, at least, is not likely to extend the concept of vote dilution
to new domains. Coalitional-district claims are thus likely to function
primarily as a one-way ratchet-recognized when invoked to unwind the
"safe" minority districts created in the last decade, as in Georgia v. Ashcroft,
but not when doing so would lock into place fixed percentages of minority
voters otherwise. And all of this interpretive work takes place in the shadow
of continuing constitutional concerns with what the Court views as the
excessive racialization of election-district design.
So much for two of the three VRA issues LULAC engaged. The VRA
requires neither coalitional districts in situations like that of Frost's district
nor requires districts that are not culturally as well as geographically
compact. But what of the third VRA claim in the case, the one the Court
accepted that led it to invalidate one of the DeLay-inspired districts as a
violation of Section 2? As noted at the outset, this is the first time in a
Section 2 case on the merits that the Court, after plenary consideration, has
held a single-member district to violate the Act. Surely the Court's
deployment of Section 2 to invalidate this one district signals a Court moving
toward greater acceptance of the VRA and the concept of minority vote
dilution?
candidates of choice. See Pildes, supra note 33 at 1519 n.22 (discussing the various views
of the Justices and collecting lower court cases); see also Scott Yut, Comment, Using
Candidate Race to Define Minority-Preferred Candidates Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 1995 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 571, 582-89 (discussing the various views of lower
courts on whether race of the candidate matters).
39 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2625 (citing Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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Even here, I think not. Justice Kennedy's opinion devotes as much space
and energy to explaining why District 25 is not required by the VRA as it
devotes to explaining why District 23 does violate the Act. Justice Kennedy
signals, in addition, that in the particular circumstances of the Texas case, he
believes District 23 essentially involved a case of intentional racial
discrimination. As the opinion puts it, the Court perceived the facts to "bear[]
the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal
protection violation." 40 The key to the Court's finding of a VRA violation
was its conclusion that, "[i]n essence the State took away the Latinos'
opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it."'4 1 For the future of
VRA doctrine, whether the Court was right to perceive Texas as a case of
intentional discrimination against Latino voters (the lower court viewed
every aspect of the gerrymandering as about partisan political control) is
beside the point. LULAC indicates only that the Court is prepared to find the
VRA violated when a State intentionally manipulates election lines to
deprive minority voters of the power they would otherwise have had the
State simply left the lines intact.
Once again, then, as with every other aspect of the opinion, the Court's
objection here is to the excessive racialization of the political process. Had
Texas left District 23 alone, Latinos would have controlled it. Because, in the
Court's perception, Texas could not tolerate that prospect, it dismantled
District 23 instead. In doing so, the Court concluded, Texas violated the
VRA. The Court's concept of intentional discrimination appears tied to an
implicit baseline of a "naturally arising minority political community." When
the State intentionally thwarts the political power that such a "naturally
arising" community would otherwise have, the State has been excessively
race conscious, discrimination has occurred, and the Act (as well as the
Constitution) has been transgressed. 42
If the Court is willing to invoke the VRA only when it spies intentional
discrimination or actions akin to it, LULAC would hardly signal a new
receptivity to the Act. Indeed, the Constitution already forbids intentional
discrimination in election-district design 3-and Justice Kennedy's language,
quoted above, strongly suggests he would have found District 23
40 Id. at 2622.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 1 view my reading here as consistent with, though cast in different terms than,
Ellen Katz's subtle and creative commentary on the case. See Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the
Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117, 1131 (2007). In Katz's view, LULAC indicates the
Court is prepared to protect, through the VRA, minority communities when they are
politically vibrant and competitive, but only then. I view the Court as prepared to protect
"naturally arising" minority communities of voters. The two perspectives point in the
same direction in LULAC and might well do so in many or most contexts.
43 See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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unconstitutional for just this reason. Moreover, the raison d'Otre of Section 2
in its current form was precisely to extend the VRA from an intent to a
results standard. Should the Court be moving toward "embracing" Section 2
by effectively limiting its reach to cases tantamount to intentional
discrimination, proponents of the results standard-which means proponents
of Section 2 in its current form-would hardly have cause to rejoice.
The unity of the legal, political, and moral vision of democracy and race
underlying LULAC is now fully revealed. In each element of the three VRA
aspects that the Court engaged, the majority sought to limit what it
considered the excessive racialization of politics and the essentializing of
racial identities in politics. In condemning District 25, the Court lambasted
combining together Latinos of radically different socioeconomic status who
lived hundreds of miles apart merely because they shared common
preferences for Latino candidates. In rejecting the VRA coalitional-district
challenge to Martin Frost's district, the Court rejected an application of the
Act that, in its view, would have led to legal oversight of numerous districts
throughout the country in the name of protecting the political power of
minority voters. And even in invalidating District 23 under the VRA, the
Court showed only that it is just as concerned about intentional
discrimination-itself a form of turning politics into an excessively racialized
matter-as it is about overly aggressive applications of the VRA or
extensions of it into new domains.
The temptation to view LULAC as an endorsement of an aggressive
approach to the VRA is understandable. Not only did the Court invoke
Section 2 for the first time to invalidate the dismantling of a congressional
district, but this result was the product of Justice Kennedy joining the four
Justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) who are routinely most
supportive of aggressive interpretations of the VRA. But such a view
requires concluding that Justice Kennedy has suddenly abandoned his
consistent, frequent, and strongly expressed skepticism about the state-
mandated use of race in districting the VRA requires.
I view LULAC in precisely the opposite way. Any "victory" for the VRA
here is a Pyrrhic one. The opinion takes away more than it gives, from the
perspective of those seeking aggressive application of the Act. Every aspect
of Justice Kennedy's controlling vote is consistent with his general,
longstanding resistance to what he views as the excessive racialization of
politics, whether that excessiveness comes about through state actors
intentionally manipulating racial identities to frustrate naturally emerging
minority communities or through aggressive applications of the VRA that
would "essentialize" racial identities by too readily treating all black or
Hispanic voters as if they share common interests. Because the results test
under Section 2 of the Act inherently requires the kind of racial essentialism
Justice Kennedy finds offensive, LULAC suggests the "Court"-in the form
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of Justice Kennedy's controlling view-remains on a collision course with
the essential thrust of certain of the Act's core features.
IV.
At the same time the Court was handing LULAC down, two major events
in the political arena occurred that might affect the Court's approach to the
VRA. The most important was Congress' decision to authorize renewal of
Section 5 of the Act for another 25 years.44 As part of this action, Congress
also took issue with Georgia v. Ashcroft, one of the major milestones in the
Court's drumbeat of retreat over the last 15 years from the most aggressive
interpretation of vote dilution. With Congress reentering the VRA lists for
the first time in 25 years, and with its seeming repudiation of the Court's
retreat, will the Court shift gears, return to the strong view of vote dilution
from the Gingles era, and now embrace a view of the Act that entails
aggressive legal mandates for minority representation-whether under
Section 5 of the Act, Section 2, or both?
For at least three reasons, it is not obvious that Congress' action will
push the Court off the path the Court has been taking. First, though Congress
did intend to "reject" Georgia v. Ashcroft, there is a great deal of ambiguity
and uncertainty about what Congress understood the renewed Act to mean.
As Professor Persily points out, in the most comprehensive academic
analysis of the renewal process, this ambiguity infects both the text of the
renewed provisions and the purposes that inform the text.45 Congress left the
new statutory provision "undefined," as Professor Persily puts it.4 6 This kind
of ambiguity and uncertainty leaves the Court considerable latitude, perhaps,
to continue to import its own vision of the Act into its interpretation of these
provisions. Second, and more concretely, the Court will find a remarkable
debate over these issues played out in the Senate Judiciary Committee
report,47 where the relevant issue was focused on most directly-a debate a
willing Court could take to confirm its own, more narrow view of the Act
even as Congress challenged one of the Court's major, recent decisions.
Although the Act passed the Senate unanimously (almost always a sure sign
that difficult issues have been papered over and avoided), the Senate
44 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, supra note 24.
45 See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-989008. Persily
devotes 24 pages to working through the various possibilities of what Congress might
have meant in its spare and cryptic overruling of Georgia v. Ashcroft.
46 Id. (manuscript at 145).
47 S. Doc. No. 109-295 at 1-64 (2006).
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Committee Report revealed deep conflict, with a partisan cast, over what the
renewed Act actually meant.48
The Report stated that, in overruling Georgia v. Ashcroft, the renewed
provisions nonetheless only protected "naturally occurring majority-minority
districts." 49 As the numerous references to this concept in the Report make
clear, the concept of a "naturally occurring majority-minority district" is the
Report's touchstone for determining when illegal vote dilution occurs under
Section 5 of the Act, at least to the committee majority (all Republican on
this issue). By "naturally occurring," the Report singled out those districts
"that would be created if legitimate, neutral principles of drawing district
boundaries, such as attention to county and municipal political borders, were
combined with the existence of a large and compact minority population to
draw a district in which minorities constitute a majority. '50 This
understanding of vote dilution, though, is not only consistent with that of
Justice Kennedy in LULAC: it is, as I have shown above, precisely the
understanding of vote dilution that Justice Kennedy embraced in LULAC
before Congress had acted. To the extent he relies on the Senate Report, then,
Justice Kennedy need not see Congress's action as a major challenge to his
prior views.51 The destruction of a majority-minority district that would
otherwise "naturally occur" can be seen as intentional racial discrimination-
just as Justice Kennedy saw it in LULAC. This is tantamount to applying the
Act only when fair application of traditional districting principles would
likely result in creation of a safe minority district; Gingles, in contrast, has
been understood (particularly in the lower courts) as requiring such a district
whenever voting is polarized and traditional districting principles could result
in creation of a safe minority district.
The third reason the Court's retreat from legally-mandated minority
representation might not be slowed by Congress's action in renewing
Section 5 of the VRA is the starkest. Justice Kennedy has intimated that, in
his view at least, Georgia v. Ashcroft is not just a statutory decision, but one
48 As Persily puts it, "[tjhe evolution of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report
offers the best window into the fragility of the political compromise that undergirds the
new VRA and the basic disagreement that exists concerning its key provision." Persily,
supra note 45 (manuscript at 113). Thus, in their "additional views" included with the
Report, the Democratic minority on the Committee revealed the depths of this internal
struggle: "We object and do not subscribe to this Committee Report... [which] has
become a very different document than the draft Report circulated by the Chairman on
July 24, 2006." S. Doc., supra note 47, at 54-55.
49 S. Doc., supra note 47, at 18, 19, 21, 24.
50 S. Doc., supra note 47, at 21.
51 The appropriate relative weight statutory text, legislative history, and the context
of enactment should bear in statutory interpretation remains, of course, a matter of
ongoing disagreement within the Supreme Court.
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compelled by the shadow of constitutional considerations. Indeed, he
suggested so in LULAC itself, where he indicated his view that Georgia v.
Ashcroft represents the principle that "serious constitutional questions"
would be raised were the Act to infuse race into the districting process
excessively without sufficient justification 52-which would have been the
case, in his view, had the Court come to a contrary result in that case. Of
course, Congress did come to that contrary result when it rejected the Court's
Georgia v. Ashcroft decision. Thus, it is possible that Justice Kennedy and
the Court would conclude that constitutional considerations require the Court
to give a narrow reading to Congress's rejection of Georgia v. Ashcroft--or,
even more dramatically, that the Court could hold this provision in the
renewed VRA unconstitutional altogether.
The second event in the political domain is a series of highly visible
national election events that might bolster the Court's resistance to legally-
mandated minority representation. In the fall 2006 elections, a black
Democratic candidate, Harold Ford, Jr., narrowly lost an extremely
competitive Senate race in the former Confederacy state of Tennessee. In the
border state of Maryland, another black Senate candidate, this one a
Republican, Michael S. Steele, also lost a close contest. But Tennessee has
been a consistently Republican state in recent national elections and
Maryland a consistently Democratic one. Ford and Steele, black Democrat
and Republican, seemed to have fared as well as white national candidates do
today in their states (the black voting-age populations of Tennessee and
Maryland are, respectively, 14.8% and 26.3%). 53 Though there were
allegations that one particularly salacious television advertisement in
Tennessee carried an implicit racial appeal, Ford ran better than did any
white Democrat for the Senate or Presidency in the 2000s, with the exception
of Al Gore, who ran almost as well in his home state in 2000 as Ford did in
2006.54 Similarly, Steele did better than any white Republican in Maryland
52 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625 (2006) (citing Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,
491 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
53 See U.S. Census Bureau, TOTAL-VOTING-AGE POPULATION AND CITIZEN VOTING-
AGE POPULATION BY SEX, FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES: 2000 (2004),
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t31/tabO1-01.pdf; US. Census Bureau,
BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN ALONE-VOTING-AGE POPULATION AND CITIZEN VOTING-
AGE POPULATION BY SEX, FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES: 2000 (2004),
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t3 1/tabOl-03.pdf.
54 The relevant Democratic vote percentages are: 32.2% (2000 Senate); 44.3% (2002
Senate); 47.3% (2000 Presidential election); 42.5% (2004 Presidential election). Ford
received 48% in the open-seat 2006 contest. The 2002 Senate race was also an open-seat
contest. See TENN. DEP'T OF STATE, NOVEMBER 2, 2004 GENERAL ELECTION UNITED
STATES PRESIDENT: BY COUNTY TOTALS (2004), http://www.state.tn.us/sos/election/
results/2004-1 1/prescounty.pdf; TENN. DEP'T OF STATE, NOVEMBER 7, 2000 GENERAL
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has for Senate or the Presidency since 1998.55 Even more visible and
dramatic, of course, is the enormous attention and enthusiasm for Senator
Barack Obama's presidential campaign, whatever the final outcome might
be.
These examples-probably the most remarkable moment, taken as
whole, in American history for black Senate and Presidential candidates-
might lead the center of the Court to believe that strong, credible black
candidates are reaching the point at which they can draw strong support from
white voters, even in Southern and border states (note that Obama did well in
his contested Democratic Senate primary even in southern Illinois, itself
much like the South). Though anecdotal evidence of this sort is not as
reliable as more comprehensive empirical studies across numerous elections
and jurisdictions, Justices on the Court might well be more influenced by
these high-profile national events than by statistical studies the Justices are
less likely to read. Based on these events, the center of the Court might
conclude there is even less need than 15 years ago, when the Court first
began to cut back on legally-mandated minority representation, to insist on
the creation of safe minority districting as the only means by which black
candidates are likely to get elected.
V.
The story of the relationship between law and practical politics in the
context of the rise of "safe" minority districting over the last generation is a
fascinating one that has not yet been adequately told. Even the legal side of
this relationship has more internal complexity than is typically recognized.
With respect to the law, those of us who work on these issues
academically have taken the Court's 1986 decision in Gingles for granted.
ELECTION OFFICIAL RESULTS (2000), http://www.state.tn.us/sos/electionlresults/2000 11/
us-state.pdf; TENN. DEP'T OF STATE, NOVEMBER 5, 2002 GENERAL ELECTION UNITED
STATES SENATE: BY COUNTY TOTALS (2002), http://www.state.tn.us/sos/election/results/
2002-1 1/us-senate.pdf.
55 The relevant Republican vote percentages are: 29% (1998 Senate); 37% (2000
Senate); 33.7% (2004 Senate); 40% (2000 Presidential election); 43% (2004 Presidential
election). Steele received 44.2% in his open-seat contest in 2006. None of these other
Senate races involved open seats. See MD. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2004 PRESIDENTIAL
GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL RESULTS (2004), http://www.elections.state.md.us/
elections/2004/general/001.html; MD. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2000 PRESIDENTIAL
GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL RESULTS, http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/
2000/results/pregapre.print.html; MD. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2004 PRESIDENTIAL
GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL RESULTS: U.S. SENATOR (2004), http://www.elections.
state.md.us/elections/2004/general/007.html; MD. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 1998
GUBERNATORIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS: U.S. SENATE (2000), http://
www.elections.state.md.us/elections/1998/ results_1998/gasen.html.
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That is, we have long thought that Gingles provided the basic framework for
giving content to the concept of vote dilution and defining when the
obligation arose to create "safe minority districts." When the Court first cut
back a bit on Gingles, these decisions seemed to many like exceptions or
retrenchments from the fundamental framework Gingles had put in place.
But in hindsight, and with many years of post-Gingles experience now in
place, this picture must be recast. As a matter of Supreme Court doctrine,
Gingles now looks more like the last gasp of an older, dying era than the
framework for a new one. The Court briefly gave birth to an aggressive
requirement of safe minority districting in the mid-1980s, toward the end of
the era when Justices Brennan and Marshall still sat on the Court. Gingles
itself was a 5-4 decision. It addressed the problem of multi-member election
systems, not the single-member districting plans that characterize
congressional districts and that dominated litigation starting in the 1990s.
And ever since the creation of Gingles, the Court has been seeking ways to
cabin its offspring. The Court has never extended Gingles or expanded on it.
Instead, it has cut back on the implications of Gingles at every opportunity.
In retrospect, it now seems clear that the half-life of majority support within
the Court for Gingles was extremely brief.
LULAC is of a piece with this larger pattern. Far from being a triumphant
moment for the Gingles vision of the VRA, LULAC has more in common
with Shaw v. Reno and Georgia v. Ashcroft. Through various doctrines, the
Court is groping for what seems to be a way to confine the concept of
minority vote dilution to cases the Court views as ones of truly intentional
state discrimination. The touchstone appears to be the concept of a "naturally
arising" minority district, one that exists or would exist due to the geographic
concentration of minority voters whose proximity also reflects common
socioeconomic and other interests.
The judicial side of this story is internally more complex, however,
because the Supreme Court returns to these issues only episodically. Just as
academic commentators took the Gingles framework as given for much of
the last 20 years, most lower courts did so as well. In the years since Gingles,
most lower courts continued to apply Gingles on its own terms, limiting
Gingles only in those specific areas where the Court expressly had done so.
Though strong support for Gingles in the Court itself appears, in hindsight, to
have lasted only for a brief moment, litigants did not test the various
premises of Gingles, and the Court was not pressed to revisit any of these
premises. Legally, the system ran on a form of automatic pilot, in which
Gingles continued to control the basic instrumentation.
The relationship of the law to the political practices in this area is even
more intriguing than that of the Supreme Court to the lower courts. Gingles,
in 1986, was an interpretation of Congress's 1982 amendments to the VRA.
But the Court was far out ahead of Congress in this area. Few observers
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believe that the 1982 Congress would have enacted the law that emerged a
few years later from the Court's interpretation in Gingles. The Court's
decision might well have been a defensible means of creating a judicially-
administrable system out of the vague and responsibility-avoiding
instructions Congress had given. But given the nature of the legislative issues
in 1982, it is difficult to conclude that Congress would have embraced the
safe-districting mandate in as routine and mechanical a form as Gingles
required. Fueled by what Gingles required and perceptions of what Gingles
required (perceptions among political actors, lawyers, and lower court
judges), the 1990s saw an explosion of safe minority election districts
throughout the country. 56 This explosion occurred more dramatically than
Congress likely had imagined and more systematically than the rising
political power of minority communities at that time would have generated
absent the fact and perception of this legal obligation. As the Court saw the
consequences of its Gingles decision, particularly as the membership of the
Court changed, it sought to pull back from the consequences of what Gingles
had wrought. Wittingly or not, the Court had precipitated a revolution in the
design of election districts.
The center of the Court has been seeking ever since to put the genie it
unleashed back in a bottle. But by now it is mostly too late. The era of
legally-mandated minority representation may continue to wane.57 To the
extent these issues come to the Court, it might seek to continue to limit
Gingles or even revisit some of that decision's core principles. Nonetheless,
the political practices of safe districting have now outrun the Court. Short of
an unlikely constitutional revolution in which the Court would hold routine
instances of safe minority districting to violate the Constitution, issues
concerning such districting are now likely to be more a matter of politics than
56 See Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1364
(1995).
57 Throughout this Article, I am focusing on legal obligations for the creation of safe
minority districts in the context of single-member districting plans, such as those used to
elect members of Congress and most state legislators. At the local government level (and
for some state legislative seats), there will continue to be litigation over at-large and
multi-member election systems. Gingles itself involved a challenge to multi-member
election districts. There is much less reason to conclude that the Court is reluctant about
continuing to apply the VRA to these contexts-the ones that formed the original context
of Gingles itself-than to the design of individual single-member districts within a
single-member districting plan. Though such claims were brought largely on behalf of
African-American voters at the time of Gingles, today they are often brought on behalf of
Hispanic voters, as evidenced in some of the most recent challenges to at-large and multi-
member districting systems. See, e.g., United States v. Osceola County, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75935 (M.D. Fla.) (Oct. 18, 2006) (holding at-large elections violated VRA rights
of Hispanic voters); Complaint, United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No. 06 Civ. 15173
(S.D.N.Y. Dec 15., 2006) (Department of Justice complaint alleging the same).
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legal mandates. With minority communities increasingly integrated into
politics, and with some of these communities forming core constituencies of
the major parties or constituencies for which the two parties are aggressively
competing, safe minority districts will arise and be sustained through the give
and take of routine (and routinely ugly) redistricting politics. Moreover, the
safe districts created in the 1990s as a result of legal mandates have
generated and will continue to generate powerful interests and constituencies
that support the maintenance of these districts. Finally, those in control of the
redistricting process, including politicians and their legal advisors, are highly
risk-averse when it comes to potential legal challenges to plans; to keep
control of the plan and the political deals it embodies, redistricters seek to
avoid giving potential litigants and courts any justification for overturning a
plan.58 The safest way to reduce risk is to create safe minority districts when
they can be designed in ways that are consistent with "traditional districting
principles" and that resemble the design of other districts, whatever the
precise content of the legal obligation to draw such districts might or might
not be.
When the Court began cutting back on legally-mandated safe districts in
the 1990s with the Shaw decision, critics complained that minority
representation would be decimated; in a famously overheated line, prominent
figures asserted that the Shaw decision was a form of "ethnic cleansing" 59
and predicted that the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) would soon have
to start meeting "in the backseat of a taxicab. '60 Subsequent years have
revealed just how exaggerated these fears were, for the CBC today is more
powerful than ever. The Court appears committed to continuing to protect
against interferences with "naturally occurring majority-minority districts."
Beyond that context, the Court might resist mandating such districts in other
circumstances. But the politics of safe districting now has a life and dynamic
of its own, one the Court is likely to affect, if at all, only at the distant
margins. If so, it will not be the first time a revolution has consumed its
creators.
58 See Bruce E. Cain & Karin MacDonald, Voting Rights Act Enforcement:
Navigating Between High and Low Expectations, in THE FuTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT 125, 126-30 (David L. Epstein et. al. eds. 2006).
59 David G. Savage, Despite Redistricting Dispute, Black Lawmakers Win
Reelection, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1996, at A10 (quoting Jesse Jackson).
60 Id. (quoting an attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
2007] 1161

